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I should like to attempt a comparison of the views on time and existence or being 
found in Martin Heidegger and in Zen Buddhism, focusing on Heidegger whom 
I know better. Ever since the 19th Century, western philosophy and literature 
has come more and more to consider whatever we mean by existence as a protest, 
as something permeated by dynamic, nonstatic movement. Examples of the 
figures who illustrate process philosophy, and if I may coin a term, process 
literature, would be, aside from Heidegger: Whitehead, Bergson, Sartre, Proust, 
Joyce. What I would like to discuss here is the fundamental question of vby 
this emphasis on time and process comes about and why time comes to be linked 
so intimately with existence, more specifically in western thought, human 
existence. In order to sort out these difficult questions of time, being, existence 
and human existence, let us begin with the most difficult one: time.
Time is a word which everyone is familiar with and perhaps no one really 
understands, not even—or perhaps especially not—the philosophers who have 
wrestled with it for 2000 years. First of all, when we speak of time, if we do at 
all, we usually mean what Heidegger calls “clock time,” keeping track of time 
in order, for instance, to get to an appointment “on time.” Here we can see 
that the word time creeps into our language without our even being aware of 
it, for what do we really mean when we say to be “on time.” To be punctual, to 
arrive somewhere at a certain numbered “point in time.” But with the phrase 
“in time” we are already getting at the heart of the question of time. Leaving 
aside the valid, but derivative, question of calculating time with a clock or 
watch, we are aware, if only vaguely, that everything is somehow in time. Stones 
are in time; plants and animals are in time. And man is in time. Everything 
is in time, but not in exactly the same way. Stones are in time in a minimal way. 
Plants, on the other hand, participate more fully in time in that they grow, 
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bloom and fade away. The animal participates still more fully in time in that it 
sleeps, it wakes, and has a certain dynamic life pattern. What about man? Man 
is the most time-related being of all, especially in the western tradition begin­
ning with Aristotle who states that time is measured by the “numbering soul”; 
i.e.> man.
These are very general preEminary remarks. Let us turn now to the topic 
thinker of this discussion—Martin Heidegger. In doing so, we shall impEcitly 
relate him to Buddhism as we go along and finally point out the differences 
between Heidegger and Buddhism.
Heidegger is perhaps the first western thinker to place finitude at the very 
core of man’s being. Of course, man’s finitude has always been acknowledged 
in western thinking; but that finitude was couched within the framework of 
some ontological security, either the ultimate immortaEty of the soul (Plato) 
or some promise of everlasting life (Christianity). One could call the finitude 
which Heidegger speaks of a radical finitude; i.e., a root finitude, unmitigated 
or alleviated by a guarantee of ontological security. And when Heidegger 
speaks of finitude, he means human finitude, just as when he speaks of existence, 
he means human existence. In Heidegger’s terminology, the beings which we 
mentioned before—stones, plants and animals—are (in time), but they do not 
exirt. To exist means literally to stand outside of oneself; and that means, in 
simple EngEsh, to be conscious—of the world, of one’s self and, ultimately, of 
the supreme significance of one’s own death. Man is the only being who knovi 
that he will die. Whatever obvious negative impbeations follow from this, 
Heidegger does not simply mean: man knows that he has a Emited life span, 
that his death is certain, and that the time of his death is absolutely uncertain. 
Heidegger’s emphasis on finitude and death is that it makes it possible for the 
human being to realize his own true possibihties. By way of interpretation, I 
would say that the time structures constituting man’s anticipation and espouse- 
ment of death make his very unique consdoumcst possible. To explain this, I must 
attempt to elucidate Heidegger’s understanding of time, and I shall forcibly 
Emit myself to that. Otherwise, we shall get lost in the specific scope of this 
discussion.
For Heidegger, clock time, with which we are all famiEar and without which 
we could not function in everyday life, is derivative of the time structures of 
human consciousness. Two things must be mentioned at this point. One, I 
am debbcrately putting Heidegger into a more conventional language, rather 
foreign to him, at the risk of flattening him down, but with the hope of making
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him comprehensible. And, two, we must bear in mind that with the term 
human consciousness, nothing subjective nor even familiar to us is meant. It is 
perhaps one of the most fundamental and significant insights of all of Heidegger’s 
thinking, early and late, that we do not know wbat or who man it. This simply 
cannot be emphasized strongly enough.
To return to the time structures of “human” consciousness. Consciousness 
is, after all, an uncanny thing. The only reason that we seldom realize this 
is that we take it for granted. We are so oriented toward the world of every­
day business that we hardly reflect on how it is that we are aware of any­
thing. This Heidegger attempts to explain. How is it that man has a certain 
open dimension which makes him able to anticipate next week, to remember 
his childhood, suddenly to be aware that he is there in the present. A dog cannot 
make a luncheon date for next Thursday. Nor can he wonder why he is doing 
something. The animal has a relationship to its world which is strange and 
unintelligible to us. This becomes evident when we observe his expression. The 
animal is, in some way, its world; it is not in its world in the way that man is 
since it has no possibility of distancing itself from that world.
What about man? According to Heidegger, man is future-oriented; he 
anticipates and thinks about what is to come, about his real possibilities for 
the sake of which he exists. His consciousness stretches forward into the future, 
and that Future comes^o meet him, so to speak. In doing so, he is brought back 
to his past, the ground upon which he stands, and when future returns to past, 
the present is engendered. Thus, a certain dimensionality and openness is 
constituted which makes his consciousness possible. If he could not anticipate 
his true possibilities and the most extreme possibility of his life, his death, his 
consciousness would, so to speak, stretch forward into a limitless nothingness, 
never to return to the past and, thus, never to experience the full present. It is 
the extreme limit and possibility of death which makes a closed structure with 
the openness of awareness possible. All of this is too brief and inadequate to be 
really clear, and we can perhaps return to it in discussion.
What I would like to point out here by way of anticipation of a difference 
between Heidegger and Buddhism is precisely the quality of making possible. 
Time, these time structures, makes consciousness possible. Here, Heidegger 
is still basically within the Kantian framework: the condition of the possibility 
of consciousness or knowledge; more simply, the question: How can I know 
something? As far as I can see, this is quite foreign to Buddhism. Buddhism 
does not share this primary concern of western philosophy which asks the
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question: How is it that I can know something? One might say that the kind 
of “knowledge” which Buddhism is interested in has to do, not with finding out 
facts and conditions of knowing those facts, but with a realization of something 
which is already there. Only something already there can be realized. I suppose 
the joke of Emerson belongs here, who, when he bumped into a tree (almost 
as bad as the proverbial Thales falling down the well because he was too busy 
looking at the heavens), said: “I saw the tree, but I didn’t realize it.”
To return to our remarks on Heidegger, we still have to say something about 
existence and its relation to time and then turn to Buddhism. As we said before, 
existence for Heidegger is uniquely human existence. To ek-sist is literally to 
stand out, to be outside of one’s self. The word “ecstatic” has the same basic 
meaning as the word for existence; to be outside of oneself, provided that we 
keep the popular, rather silly, connotation of that word, ecstatic, at a distance. 
To put it in somewhat oversimplified, non-Heideggerian language, consciousness 
is a being outside of oneself, outside in the “world”—not the measurable, object­
ive world of science or physics, but closer to the usage of world which we mean 
when we say that someone lives in his own “world.” To ek-sist is to be aware 
of self and world, of self-in-the-world. Only the human being has this kind of 
awareness. One of Heidegger’s examples for this is that a desk can never touch 
a wall. The desk might be physically smack up against the wall, but it can 
never touch that wall in the way a person can touch it.
To conclude on Heidegger, only the human being has awareness, exists as time, 
spinning, so to speak, the stuff and form of consciousness in and as time, timing.
Now, what about existence and time in Buddhism? Since to speak about 
Buddhism in general makes about as much sense as to speak about western 
philosophy in general—far too vast a subject—1 shall limit myself to speaking 
and, above all, asking about Dogen. Dogen lived in the 13th century, at a time 
when scholasticism was in its prime in the west. Dogen speaks of existence­
time, and one might well be tempted to compare him with the title of Heideg­
ger’s classic, major work: Being and Time. Undoubtedly, there is a relation. But 
hr from inquiring into the relation of existence or being (I am using these terms 
synonymously here) to the question of how we know, Dogen focuses totally 
on the relation of existence-time to practice-enlightenment. And to fuss a bit, 
there is no “and” for Dogen between existence and time; there is a hyphen. I 
might add that, at least for me, Dogen is so difficult that Heidegger sometimes 
looks like mere ontological child’s play in comparison. But this, undoubtedly, 
has to do with my greater familiarity with Heidegger.
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Dogen shares with Heidegger the emphasis on the radical finitude of man, a 
finitude unshielded by a creator God or a realm of guaranteed personal im­
mortality. Together with this emphasis on finitude and, of course, ultimately 
bound up with it, Dogen stresses, as does Heidegger, the impermanence of 
existence. Existence is shot through with impermanence, change, with the 
untenability of everything. Here, Dogen is even more radical than Heidegger, 
especially the later Heidegger. These two things the thinkers share. Then, 
however, there are at least two basic differences between them. Although 
Buddhism regards man as a privileged being—it is very difficult and rare to be 
bom a human being and it is precisely the human being who alone has the 
opportunity to gain enlightenment—still Buddhism does not have the western 
conception of man as the rational animal, the animal with a kind of second floor 
reason superimposed on his animality. Thus, for Buddhism, existence is not 
sheerly human existence and time is not limited to a constitutive function of 
human consciousness. All sentient beings are finitely existent and everything is 
time, although even Buddhism would probably be able to say that man has a 
distinctive relation to time without having an exclusive claim upon it.
The second distinction between Heidegger and Dogen is more technical, 
and has to do with their understanding of time as such. However innovative 
Heidegger’s analysis of time may be—and I believe that it is innovative—he 
shares with the whole western Christian and secularized Christian tradition 
(for example, Karl Marx) the emphasis on the future as the meaning of history. 
Man, and humanity in general, is profoundly directed toward the future. Rea­
lity does not lie in the past as it did for Plato, for whom what is real has nothing 
to do with time and is to be known by recollection, remembering a vision of 
absolute justice or absolute good. Rather, for the post-Greek western tradition, 
reality lies in the future. Something is to be attained in the future through the 
process of history, whether it be the overcoming of sin and evil through re­
demption and the last judgment, or whether it be the attainment of a classless 
society through the abolishment of class distinction. Whereas Heidegger would 
accept neither of these two goals of history or, for that matter, any of the other 
traditional western goals, there is still a very definite eschatology in his philo­
sophy of Being, particularly in the later works. Heidegger envisions a possible 
rapprochement or belonging together of man and Being if we do not get com­
pletely stuck in the essence of modem technology.
And Dogen? The crucial mode of time for Dogen is the present. Not just any 
present “now” of ordinary clock time, but what he calls the “absolute present.”
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This needs to be clarified. Insofar as we understand it at all, most of us—parti­
cularly anyone familiar with medieval philosophy—will be inclined to picture 
an absolute present as something lifted out of time, as a nunc stans or a standing 
now which is timeless. Here the word “absolute” has to mean ab-solved or 
detached from time, outside of time, “eternal” in the sense of what is everlasting.
A few quotes from Dogen will show that he cannot mean this at all. The word 
“absolute,” and thus the phrase absolute present, and the meaning of the word 
“present” in general, must be something quite different. In the light of what 
I understand of Dogen’s emphasis on practice (sitting) and the inseparability 
of practice and absolute present, it would seem to me that the absolute present 
would be a dimension of transient time itself, not a moment lifted out of it, and 
that this absolute present would be primarily realized in human action. This 
would fit in with Dogen’s de-emphasis on enlightenment as a single, momentary 
final experience and his emphasis on practice and sustained exertion right at 
this moment.
“Man will find the proof of eternity by throwing himself into this present 
and that present and by living up his whole existence in this present.”
“When time is not thought of as coming and going, this moment is absolute 
time for me... it appears to be passing, but it is now ... Do not regard time 
as merely flying away, do not think that flying away is its sole function. For 
time to fly away there would have to be a separation (between it and things). 
Because you imagine that time only passes, you do not learn the truth of being­
time. In a word, every being in the entire world is a separate time in one con­
tinuum. And since being is time, I am my being-time. Time has the quality of 
passing, so to speak, from today to tomorrow, from today to yesterday, from 
yesterday to today, from today to today, from tomorrow to tomorrow. Because 
this passing is a characteristic of time, present time and past time do not overlap 
or impinge upon one another... since you and I are time, practice-enlighten­
ment is time.”1
I Cited in The Three Pillart of Zen, cd. by Philip Kapleau, Boston, 1968.
The apparent contradictions for our conceptual minds in these passages are 
enormous. But, beginning with Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, and even in a 
different way, Hegel, philosophy is beginning no longer to find contradiction so 
objectionable. For Kierkegaard, for instance, the truth of Christianity is an 
absolute paradox incomprehensible to reason; namely, that God became man, 
that eternity entered time. Thus, wc must not lose patience or throw up our
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precious arms in indignant despair if Dogen does not conform to the expecta­
tions of our comfortably rational minds.
What is Dogen saying? He is saying that the flying away and passing by of 
time is not so central as we are prone to take it. This very preoccupation with 
the flying away of time is precisely what prevents us from understanding the 
truth, the meaning of being-time. If I am time, time cannot just fly away from 
me. It is the abstracting and separation of myself from time which blinds me to 
my identity with it. What could I be if I am not in time? Where could anything 
exist if it were not (in) time?
The other point that Dogen seems to be really making in these passages 
quoted supports the former point, although on the surface it seems to contradict 
it. Having said that we are too preoccupied with the flying away of time, Dogen 
turns around and states that time has the quality of passing, so to speak, from 
today to tomorrow, from today to yesterday, from yesterday to today, from 
today to today, from tomorrow to tomorrow. Yes, time moves; but it moves 
in no way intelligible to our conceptual understanding of it. From today to 
today? What kind of flying away is this? What is important about the movement 
of time here is not its flying away, its robbing us of our possessions, desires and 
experiences; but, rather, its quality of non-obstruction and non-hindrance. It 
allows things to be without getting in the way of each other.
Whereas the western standing now is lifted out of time and is, therefore, 
timeless, excluding past and future, Dogen’s absolute present includes all time— 
past, present and future—in the sense that there is nothing outside of it. If some­
thing is not now, when is it? Dogen’s absolute present is not only presence, 
but complete fullness. In contrast to the timeless standing now which negates 
time and is unable to relate to time, Dogen’s absolute present is, so to speak, 
the sheer occurrence of time itself. This is what I take to be the meaning of 
Dogen’s rejection of abrupt, final enlightenment. There is no absolute present 
of satori which settles everything once and for all because such a once and for 
all, such a finality, is not possible in finite existence. If enlightenment is in the 
middle of birth and death, we cannot just take ourselves straight out of existence 
and bask complacently in that enlightenment. After the moment of enlighten­
ment comes another moment, and again and again other moments. The sustained 
exertion in practice of which Dogen speaks would mean the realization of the 
incessant, non-obstructing occurrence of time and the impossibility of some final 
moment which we can cling to as a much-cherished, idolized moment. It seems 
to me that Dogen is not really so much saying that enlightenment is gradual;
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but that, ultimately, there is nothing to be attained, but everything to be realized, 
in actual practice.
A western thinker perhaps closer to Buddhism than even Heidegger would 
be Meister Eckhart. Eckhart states that: “The nunc (now, eternity) is a taste 
of time, is a tip of time, and an end of time.” This is a truly non-conceptual 
description of time and eternity. You cannot taste clock time. Clock time can 
only be calculated and reckoned with, but not tasted.
What Eckhart is saying, what Heidegger is saying, and in the most radical 
way, what Dogen is saying about time, is that we should not conceptualize it 
as something separate from ourselves or anything else and that we should not 
chop it up into the disparate images of past, present and future. In doing so 
—and we all do it—we cut ourselves off from what we are and fall prey to a dread 
of something that does not exist in this manner. What have not our poets, 
Shakespeare, Goethe, etc., written about the ravages of time. This is, again, 
a preoccupation with the flying away of time as if it were something separate 
from us, a preoccupation which shuts us off from any possible experience of 
Dogen’s absolute present. If we fear to lose existence to the flying away and 
ravages of time, and if we cling to an idea of existence apart from time, how 
can we ever realize the identity of our existence with time? We should perhaps 
learn to experience the absence of the “and” in Being and Time and perhaps even 
of the hyphen between existence-time.
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